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By Richard G Davis

Carl A. Spaatz and the air warfare in europe

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The air branch’s basic &andadvanced flight training eliminated a large percentage of would-be pilots. On the average, about 40 percent of each entering class completed both stages of training, although in some classes as few as 25 percent graduated. Charles A. 35 Because the Air Service (and its predecessors) had existed only since 1907, it had had no time to develop its own higher-ranking officers. Even Hap Arnold, Maj. Gen. Mason Patrick, Chief of the Air Service, and Brig. Gen. William “Billy” Mitchell, early 1920s.

Elwood R. Quesada, Capt. Ira C. Eaker, Fechet, Maj. Carl A. Spaatz, and Sgt. Roy G . Hooe. its aegis all the tactical units based in the United States. It formed thee combat wings, one at its headquarters at Langley Field and the other two at Barksdale Field in Louisiana and March Field in California. This measure at least brought much of the Air Corps’ combat strength into a single cohesive command structure. Unfortunately, this reorganization grafted GHQ Air Force onto the already existing Air Corps.

It underestimated the capacity of a modem industrial nation and its populace to survive repeated and heavy bombing. It overestimated the ability of air technology to develop bombs big enough to damage heavy equipment or reinforced concrete and the ease with which those new bombs could be manufactured. It discounted the possibility of improvements in air defense and fighter technology that would reverse the advantage held by the bomber. In their most extreme position, heavy-bomber enthusiasts assumed that fighter defenses would be unable to locate bombers until they had dropped their bombs.

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